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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
New Hampshire Constitution, Part I, Article 6:
As morality and piety, rightly grounded on high principles, will give the best and
greatest security to government, and will lay, in the hearts of men, the strongest
obligations to due subjection; and as the knowledge of these is most likely to be
propagated through a society, therefore, the several parishes, bodies corporate, or
religious societies shall at all times have the right of electing their own teachers, and
of contracting with them for their support or maintenance, or both. But no person
shall ever be compelled to pay towards the support of the schools of any sect or
denomination. And every person, denomination or sect shall be equally under the
protection of the law; and no subordination of any one sect, denomination or
persuasion to another shall ever be established.
New Hampshire Constitution, Part II, Article 83:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being essential to
the preservation of a free government; and spreading the opportunities and
advantages of education through the various parts of the country, being highly
conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates,
in all future periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and the
sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage private and public
institutions, rewards, and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts,
sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and natural history of the country; to
countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence,
public and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and punctuality,
sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments, among the
people: Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall ever be
granted or applied for the use of the schools or institutions of any religious sect or
denomination. Free and fair competition in the trades and industries is an inherent
and essential right of the people and should be protected against all monopolies and
conspiracies which tend to hinder or destroy it. The size and functions of all
corporations should be so limited and regulated as to prohibit fictitious
capitalization and provision should be made for the supervision and government
thereof. Therefore, all just power possessed by the state is hereby granted to the
general court to enact laws to prevent the operations within the state of all persons
and associations, and all trusts and corporations, foreign or domestic, and the
officers thereof, who endeavor to raise the price of any article of commerce or to
destroy free and fair competition in the trades and industries through combination,
conspiracy, monopoly, or any other unfair means; to control and regulate the acts of
all such persons, associations, corporations, trusts, and officials doing business
within the state; to prevent fictitious capitalization; and to authorize civil and
criminal proceedings in respect to all the wrongs herein declared against.
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS
Governor Margaret Hassan has served as Governor of the State of New
Hampshire since January 3, 2013.

As Governor, she is responsible for

protecting the many rights and immunities enshrined in the New Hampshire
Constitution. She also is responsible for enforcing its many obligations and
limitations on government.

Among these is an obligation to ensure that

revenues generated through the taxation of New Hampshire citizens be put
to constitutionally appropriate uses.
The New Hampshire Constitution explicitly prohibits the use of
“money raised by taxation”—i.e. public funds—for the benefit of “the schools
or institutions of any religious sect or denomination,” N.H. CONST. part II,
art. 83 (“Article 83”); see also N.H. CONST. part I, art. 6 (“Article 6”) (affirming
that “no person shall ever be compelled to pay towards the support of the
schools of any sect or denomination”). In the Governor’s view, the superior
court correctly concluded that the education tax credit program enacted
under N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. (“RSA”) § 77-G violates this prohibition.
Consistent with her responsibilities under the New Hampshire Constitution,
and in the best traditions of previously elected leaders, the Governor files this
amicus brief to explain her position on this important constitutional ruling
and to urge this Court to affirm it. See N.H. CONST. part II, art. 41 (“Article
41”).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 9, 2013, eight New Hampshire residents and a New
Hampshire business entity challenged the constitutionality of the tax credit
program enacted pursuant to RSA § 77-G in an action seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief. The State and four intervenors (three individuals and a
New Hampshire non-profit business entity) defended.
In an order dated June 17, 2013, the superior court (Lewis, J.) held
that the program violates Article 83 insofar as it permits organizations
authorized to receive donations subsidized by the tax credit to use those
donations to fund student scholarships to religious, non-public schools. Order
at 40. In so ruling, the court concluded, over the defendants’ objections, that
the plaintiffs had standing to press their claims. Id. at 14-20. The court also
concluded, over objections by the plaintiffs and the defendant-intervenors,
that the program could continue to operate constitutionally so long as the
revenue it generates is not used to fund student scholarships to religious,
non-public schools. Id. at 40-44. The State and defendant-intervenors have
filed timely appeals, and the plaintiffs have filed a timely cross-appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Governor adopts and incorporates by reference the Statement of
Facts set forth in the answering brief of the plaintiffs/cross-appellants.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Governor confines her argument in this amicus brief to whether
the superior court correctly concluded that the education tax credit program
enacted under RSA § 77-G violates Article 83 insofar as it permits
organizations authorized to receive donations subsidized by the credit to use
those donations to fund student scholarships to religious, non-public schools.
In the Governor’s view, the superior court’s finding of unconstitutionality was
correct.
In its text, structure, and history (including its interpretive history),
the New Hampshire Constitution significantly differs from the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause with respect to the question whether
revenue generated through taxation—i.e., public funds—may be used to
subsidize student scholarships to religious, non-public schools. Accordingly,
more permissive federal court precedents interpreting the Establishment
Clause should have little bearing on this question.

Under the New

Hampshire Constitution, the answer to the question is “no”; public funds may
not be used to subsidize student scholarships to religious, non-public schools.
Public financial support of religious schools would not only violate the
constitutional rights of New Hampshire taxpayers who do not wish their tax
dollars to subsidize the operation of such schools, but it also would
necessitate additional public regulation of the affairs of religious schools.
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Either way, the result would be a dangerous state entanglement in religion
that is inconsistent with New Hampshire’s Constitution and traditions.
The question therefore becomes whether the superior court correctly
concluded that revenue raised and appropriated through the tax credit
program enacted pursuant to RSA § 77-G constitutes “money raised by
taxation” within the meaning of Article 83. The superior court’s conclusion
was correct. The monies made available to schools through RSA § 77-G are
monies raised by taxation. The legislature has appropriated a portion of New
Hampshire’s tax dollars to pay for scholarships to religious schools through
the tax credit program. Any other conclusion would require this Court to
bless a formalistic and functionally meaningless distinction between tax
dollars appropriated directly by the State, and tax dollars directed to
religious schools through the tax credit program legislation. Such a crabbed
reading of the Article 83 guarantee would jeopardize both the hallowed
underpinnings of religious tolerance and freedom, and the prohibition against
entanglement made sacred by our New Hampshire Constitution. This Court
should not vindicate a formalism that would enable an easy end-run around a
basic constitutional limit on the power of the State with respect to taxpayer
funds.
Finally, the violation of Article 83 occasioned by RSA § 77-G is no mere
technical breach of the wall of separation between church and state. The
Governor views tax incentives as appropriate tools of public policy when

5

revenues are allocated to constitutional uses. Moreover, nothing prevented
individuals or businesses from contributing to private religious schools of
choice—and from enjoying the federal tax benefits of such contributions—
before RSA § 77-G was adopted, and nothing prevents them from doing so
now.

Yet § 77-G creates a vehicle by which substantial sums of public

revenue raised through the taxation of New Hampshire citizens would be
diverted to religious, non-public institutions. Such a financially imprudent
diversion of scarce tax dollars would undermine the State’s ability to meet its
other obligations in the coming years, including the provision of an adequate
education for all New Hampshire children; providing New Hampshire’s civil
and criminal justice systems with adequate resources to ensure the delivery
of justice in New Hampshire; and maintaining the health, safety and wellbeing of New Hampshire’s citizens.
The superior court’s order should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I. Notwithstanding Permissive Federal Precedent Interpreting the
Federal Establishment Clause, the New Hampshire Constitution
Clearly Prohibits the Use of Public Funds to Subsidize Student
Scholarships to Religious, Non-public Schools.
In relevant part, the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” The
quoted text constitutes the entirety of the federal Constitution’s religion
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clauses—i.e., its Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.

The federal

Constitution makes no mention of public funding for religious schools or
institutions. Thus, federal Establishment Clause precedent setting limits on
what legislatures may do in connection with directing public funds to
religious schools and institutions has developed over time as a species of
constitutional common law, unmoored from the federal Constitution’s lessthan-illuminating text.
The text of the New Hampshire Constitution is far more specific on
this

issue.

Indeed,

two

separate

provisions

explicitly

express

an

unwillingness on the part of New Hampshire citizens to see public funds
directed to religious schools or institutions. Article 6, titled “Morality and
Piety,” states:
As morality and piety, rightly grounded on high principles, will
give the best and greatest security to government, and will lay,
in the hearts of men, the strongest obligations to due subjection;
and as the knowledge of these is most likely to be propagated
through a society, therefore, the several parishes, bodies
corporate, or religious societies shall at all times have the right
of electing their own teachers, and of contracting with them for
their support or maintenance, or both. But no person shall ever
be compelled to pay towards the support of the schools of any
sect or denomination. And every person, denomination or sect
shall be equally under the protection of the law; and no
subordination of any one sect, denomination or persuasion to
another shall ever be established.
N.H. CONST. part 1, art. 6 (emphasis supplied).
Moreover, Article 83, titled “Encouragement of Literature, Etc.” in
relevant part states:
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Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a
community, being essential to the preservation of a free
government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of
education through the various parts of the country, being highly
conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of the
legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this
government, to cherish the interest of literature and the
sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage
private and public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the
promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades,
manufactures, and natural history of the country; to
countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and
general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and
economy, honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all
social affections, and generous sentiments, among the people:
Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall
ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools or
institutions of any religious sect or denomination.
N.H. CONST. part. II, art. 83 (emphasis supplied).
Given the profound textual differences between the federal and state
constitutions, it is evident that permissive federal court precedents
interpreting the Establishment Clause should have little bearing on this
Court’s analysis of the principal question raised by these cross-appeals. The
text of the New Hampshire Constitution makes it plain that public subsidies
raised through the taxation of New Hampshire citizens cannot be used to
defray the costs of attending religious, non-public schools. Significantly, this
constitutional prohibition protects both secular and religious interests.
Obviously, it protects the rights of those who do not want their tax dollars to
subsidize religious education.

But by foreclosing an entanglement that

surely would bring additional public oversight and regulation, it also
safeguards the liberty of religious schools and institutions themselves.
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Many provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution are more
protective of constitutional liberty than corresponding provisions in the
United States Constitution. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232-33 (1983)
(collecting examples). This Court must accord such provisions their proper
scope and breadth as a matter of New Hampshire constitutional law. Indeed,
the Court has forcefully stated that to do otherwise would constitute a failure
to safeguard the federalism that is so cherished by the New Hampshire
citizenry.

See id. at 231.

Articles 6 and 83 of the New Hampshire

Constitution are far more protective of constitutional liberty than the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court should
recognize them as such.
II. The Superior Court Correctly Concluded That the Monies Made
Available to Schools Through RSA § 77-G are Monies “Raised by
Taxation” Within the Meaning of Article 83.
The superior court ruled that RSA § 77-G effectively appropriates
“public funds,” or “money raised by taxation,” when it grants tax credits to
offset business donations to approved scholarship organizations. Order at 26.
The Governor—who is constitutionally responsible for the “faithful execution
of the laws,” Article 41—strongly endorses the superior court’s well-reasoned
ruling.

This Court should affirm that providing tax credits against the

business profits and business enterprise taxes constitutes an expenditure of
“money raised by taxation” pursuant to Article 83.
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The program enacted by RSA § 77-G permits businesses to pay a
portion of their due and owing taxes—i.e., the “public funds” for which they
are legally responsible—to a legislatively approved entity for a legislatively
desired purpose instead of paying those taxes directly to the State. Either
way, the funds in question are “public funds” that may be used only for
specific, state-designated purposes. Under no circumstances are these funds
available to the donor businesses for private uses.
By statute, the state budgeting process involves projecting the
“expenditure needs of the government” and identifying “the means through
which such expenditures will be financed,” RSA § 9:3, I(a), including
“estimated revenues . . . on the basis of existing laws,”

RSA § 9:3, I(c).

Existing laws include the business profits tax, RSA § 77-A, and the business
enterprise tax, RSA § 77-E. The General Court passed these laws, and the
then-sitting Governors signed them into law, in order to raise revenues to
meet the State’s obligations in a responsible manner.
To find that the funds generated by these tax credits are not “money
raised by taxation” would require the indulgence of a meaningless formalism
that ignores New Hampshire’s long-standing tradition of treating tax credits
and exemptions as equivalent to tax expenditures.

See Morrison v.

Manchester, 58 N.H. 538, 1879 WL 4100, *14 (1879) (declaring that a tax
“exemption is an expenditure of public money”); State v. U.S. & Canada
Express Co., 60 N.H. 219, 1880 WL 10588, *36 (1880) (“The generation by
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whom the constitution was adopted understood the state could pay a sum of
money to an individual, for a public purpose, by exempting him from the
payment of the same amount of tax.”); Canaan v. District, 74 N.H. 517, 537
(1908) (declaring that “all exemptions from taxation are practically
equivalent to a direct appropriation”); Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town of Gilsum,
84 N.H. 1, 146 A. 511, 516 (1929) (“A special tax exemption is one form of
appropriating public money.”); Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 579,
581-82 (1969) (finding bill that would allow $50.00 property tax credit to
parents of children attending a nonpublic school unconstitutional because it
constituted public funds that could be contributed to non-secular schools).
Indeed, the Governor is aware of no New Hampshire case law suggesting that
tax credits are anything other than the expenditure of public funds.
This longstanding treatment of tax credits as expenditures of public
funds recognizes the reality that state government relies on revenues
generated through taxation to fulfill its duties and obligations.

In

discharging her obligation to prepare balanced biennial state budgets
pursuant to RSA § 9:2, the Governor must account for all legally obligated
expenditures, including those that will be accomplished through tax credits.
A legislative act that directs public funds away from the State for a
designated state-directed purpose is functionally indistinguishable from a
legislative expenditure of funds already in the State’s treasury. Both use
publicly designated funds to accomplish a state-directed purpose, and both
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constitute the expenditure of “public funds” or “money raised by taxation.”
Pursuant to the program enacted by RSA § 77-G, money that would
otherwise be flowing directly to the State is diverted for the very specific and
direct purpose of providing scholarships to students at non-public schools,
including religious schools.
The Court should not vindicate a formalism that would enable an easy
end-run around a basic constitutional limit on the power of the State with
respect to taxpayer funds. It should affirm the superior court’s conclusion
that the tax credits authorized by RSA § 77-G are monies “raised by taxation”
within the meaning of Article 83.
III. RSA § 77-G Downshifts Education Expenses to Local Property
Taxpayers and Undermines the State’s Ability to Meet Its Other
Obligations in Coming Years.
As set forth above, RSA § 77-G fails constitutional scrutiny under
Article 83 insofar as it functions to channel tax dollars to scholarships that
benefit religious schools. Moreover, this constitutional violation is no mere
technical breach of the wall of separation between church and state. While
the Governor applauds the creative use of tax incentives as appropriate tools
of public policy when revenues are allocated to constitutional uses, RSA § 77G would divert substantial sums of public revenue to religious schools. The
effect would be to place even greater burdens on local property taxpayers and
to undermine the State’s ability to meet its other obligations, such as the
provision of an adequate education to all New Hampshire children; providing
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New Hampshire’s civil and criminal justice systems with adequate resources
to ensure the delivery of justice in New Hampshire; and maintaining the
safety and well-being of New Hampshire’s citizens.
The Governor has a duty to be fiscally responsible; she must ensure
the efficient and proper use of tax dollars for legitimate public purposes. RSA
§ 77-G would greatly undermine this task. If permitted to go into full effect,
it would result in multi-million-dollar losses to local school districts. Such
losses would be a consequence of the reductions in state adequacy aid to
public schools that the program mandates. See New Hampshire Department
of Education Projections, Plaintiffs’ Appendix at 1377, 1380, 1384, 1388–89;
see also id. at 79. These losses to local districts would be many times greater
than the initial, modest savings the program might generate at the state
level, see id. at 1377, 1380, 1388–89, and will accrue over at least 16 years,
see RSA § 77-G:2, I(b).
Moreover, these losses are unlikely to fall evenly across the State.
Given the nature of the program, school districts in which religious schools
are located will likely be more significantly affected by student transfers and
the consequent loss of adequacy funding. RSA § 77-G does not take into any
account whatsoever the inability of school districts that will be most harmed
to make up their losses through additional local property taxation. Although
the tax credit program provides for stabilization grants in RSA § 77-G:8, such
grants do not sufficiently offset losses in adequacy funding. See RSA 77-G:8,
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I. Moreover, the stabilization grants must be funded somehow, and there is
no mechanism to raise additional monies to fund such grants (which will
undoubtedly require additional taxpayer dollars).

While the program is

projected to last more than 16 years, the partial hold-harmless grants to
school districts last no more than four years. Compare RSA § 77-G:2, I(b)
with RSA § 77-G:8, I. Thus, a school district whose second grader transfers
away as a result of the program loses the adequacy funding associated with
that child when she reaches sixth grade. RSA § 77-G:8, I. This loss is hardly
offset by cost savings achieved from the departure of a single student from a
class of, say, 20.

Application of RSA § 77-G over time would negatively

impact local public schools and taxpayers.
Moreover, the burden on New Hampshire taxpayers resulting from the
diversion of tax dollars would be substantial. New Hampshire has a unique
and carefully guarded taxing scheme.

The education tax credit program

would permit the diversion of $3.4 million in taxes in 2013 and $5.1 million in
2014, with the opportunity for the total to escalate in future years pursuant
to RSA § 77-G:4, II-III.

If certain conditions are met, the State could

experience a diversion of more than $30 million in taxes by 2022 and more
than $300 million by 2033. See Plaintiffs’ Appendix at 54. Permitting such a
diversion of scarce taxpayer resources would undermine the State’s ability to
discharge its fiscal responsibilities.
Nothing prevented individuals or businesses from contributing to
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private religious schools of choice—and from enjoying the federal tax benefits
of such contributions—before RSA § 77-G was adopted, and nothing prevents
them from doing so now. In fact, private donations enable such schools to
offer scholarships directly to students who would otherwise not be able to
afford the education. But public funds cannot and should not be put to the
same use.
The Governor treasures the diversity of private schools in our state,
and fully appreciates their contributions to tolerance and learning.

But the

decision to contribute to a private religious school is a personal decision. It
should not be supported by the State’s tax structure, and it should not have
the effect of diverting scarce taxpayer dollars from crucial public needs. The
superior court’s finding that RSA § 77-G violates Article 83 should be
affirmed.
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